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1 Introduction
Published in 1962, the o¢ cial report written by the French demographer Alfred
Sauvy concluded that the level of fertility in Wallonia was too low in comparison
with what would be the socially optimal fertility level. According to Sauvy, the
too low fertility level in Wallonia at that time led to a too low proportion
of young workers with respect to older workers. As a consequence, Wallonias
economy was, in Sauvys own words, peopled of old workers having old thoughts
in old houses. In the light of this observation, Sauvy recommended a 20 % rise
in the fertility level of Wallonia, in such a way as to maintain the dynamism of
the Walloon economy.
Undoubtedly, Sauvys views on what constitutes the "optimal fertility" are
deep, and cannot be summarized in one single formula. According to his Theorie
Générale de la Population (1956, chapter 4), there exist not one, but several
possible social objectives to be used to dene what one means by an optimal
fertility. One could take, for instance, not only total or average welfare (as
economists often do), but, also, the total quantity of life, the total population
size, the development of culture and knowledge, the promotion of longevity and
health, and also power (available means to be a¤ected to some goal, military or
not). Thus there exist, according to Sauvy, lots of ways to dene the goal with
respect to which some fertility can be regarded as "optimal".
The objective of this paper is to reconsider Sauvys view on optimal fertility
within a formal model. Our purpose is to try to incorporate Sauvys view as
expressed in his 1962 report in standard optimal fertility models in economics,
taking social welfare as a goal.
The economic theory of optimal fertility dates back to Samuelsons (1975)
seminal paper, where he characterized the optimal fertility rate in a Diamond-
type 2-period OLG economy with physical capital accumulation. Samuelson
showed there that the interior optimal fertility rate, when it exists, equalizes,
at the margin, two e¤ects: on the one hand, the capital dilution e¤ect (or
Solow e¤ect), according to which a higher fertility rate makes it more di¢ cult
to sustain a high steady-state capital to labor ratio; on the other hand, the
intergenerational redistribution e¤ect (also called Samuelson e¤ect), according
to which a higher fertility, by reducing the demographic weight of the elderly,
contributes to relax the economys resource constraint by reducing the weight
of the elderlys consumption. Following Samuelson, several papers analyzed the
conditions under which an interior optimal fertility rate exists in the standard
Samuelsonian economy (see Deardor¤ 1976, Michel and Pestieau 1993), or in
other economies, with, for example, endogenous fertility choices (Abio 2003),
risky lifetime (de la Croix et al 2012) and several fertility periods (Pestieau and
Ponthiere 2014).
Our goal is to extend the standard Samuelsonian economy to examine the
impact of old workers skills decay on the socially optimal fertility. Our ques-
tions are the following. Is it possible, within a simple Samuelsonian model, to
do justice to Sauvys intuition, according to which an older labor force justies a
higher optimal fertility? Was Sauvy right in his diagnosis on the suboptimality
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of fertility in Wallonia? In order to answer those questions, we proceed in two
stages. First, we develop a simple 4-period OLG model with capital accumula-
tion. A specicity of our model with respect to Samuelsons framework is that
there exists not one, but two generations of workers (young and old), the skills
of the latter being subject to some form of decay. We then use that model to
characterize the optimal fertility rate, and study then the impact of skills decay
on its level. Second, we calibrate that model using general functional form for
utility functions and production functions, and compare the optimal fertility
levels with Sauvys recommendations.
Anticipating our results, we show, when characterizing the optimal fertility
level, that this equalizes, at the margin, the sum of the capital dilution e¤ect
(Solow e¤ect) and the labor age-composition e¤ect (Sauvy e¤ect) with the in-
tergenerational redistribution e¤ect (Samuelson e¤ect). Hence, it is, in theory,
possible to reconcile Sauvys views with standard economic views on optimal
fertility. Note, however, that, in theory, the impact of the decay in skills on
optimal fertility is not monotonous, and depends strongly on the economic fun-
damentals. Thus, although Sauvys views that a higher decay justies a higher
fertility can be rationalized in some cases, there exist also cases in theory where
a higher degree of decay does not lead to a higher optimal fertility. On the em-
pirical side, our numerical simulations suggest that, for standard values of the
structural parameters of the economy, it is extremely di¢ cult to reconcile our
framework with Sauvys views. Our analysis suggests that the socially optimal
fertility rate is lower than the one observed in Wallonia at the time of Sauvys
report, and thus we cannot nd support for his recommendation.
In sum, although Sauvys intuitions can be incorporated in the theoretical
analysis of optimal fertility, and although a higher decay of old workersskills
can, in theory, lead to a higher optimal fertility rate, our numerical analysis
does not seem to support Sauvys views on the suboptimal level of fertility in
Wallonia in the 1950s and 1960s.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
The laissez-faire is derived in Section 3. The optimal fertility rate is charac-
terized in Section 4. Section 5 provides some numerical simulations. Section 6
concludes.
2 The model
We consider a four-period OLG model with physical capital accumulation. Time
goes from 0 to +1. The duration of each period is normalized to one. The
rst period is childhood. The second period is young adulthood, during which
each individual works, saves, consumes and has n children. The third period is
a period during which individuals work, save and consume. Finally, the fourth
period is the old age, during which individuals enjoy their savings. That period
is lived through a probability .
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2.1 Demography and labour force
The population size follows the dynamic law:
Nt+1 = nNt (1)
where Nt denotes the number of individuals born at period t, while n is the
fertility rate.
The total labour force at time t, denoted by Lt, is equal to:
Lt = Nt 1 + Nt 2 (2)
where  2 [0; 1] captures the extent of decay in the skills of old workers. When
! 0, old workers have a very low productivity in comparison to young workers.
On the contrary, when  ! 1, old workers are almost as productive as young
workers. This gap in productivity between the young and the old may be due
to lots of di¤erent causes. One obvious cause lies in the fact, emphasized by
Boucekkine et al (2002), that the education of old workers dates back to a
more distant epoch, which can make their skills relatively out of date. Thus
our modelling of labor can be regarded as a reduced form of the continuous
time vintage human capital economy considered in Boucekkine et al (2002),
which is here simplied by the fact that we do not take education choices into
account, but, rather, suppose that time naturally depreciates human skills and
productivity. One could reply to this argument that, under standard learning
by doing, we should have  > 1 instead of   1, since workers are learning
how to better produce over time, and thus would become more productive with
the age. We will further discuss the link between age and productivity when we
will calibrate the model in Section 5.
Using the law for population dynamics, total labour can be rewritten as:
Lt = nNt 2 + Nt 2
= Nt 2 (n+ ) (3)
2.2 Production
The production of an output Yt involves capital Kt and labor Lt, according to
the function:
Yt = F (Kt; Lt) = F (Kt; Lt) + (1  )Kt (4)
where  is the depreciation rate of capital. The production function F (Kt; Lt)
is supposed to be homogeneous of degree 1. Thus the total production function
F (Kt; Lt) is also homogeneous of degree 1. The production process can be
rewritten in intensive terms as:
yt = F

kt;
Nt 2 (n+ )
Nt 2n

= F

kt; 1 +

n

(5)
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where yt  YtNt 1 denotes the output per young worker, whereas kt  KtNt 1
denotes the capital stock per young worker.
The resource constraint of the economy is:
F (Kt; Lt) = ctNt 1 + dtNt 2 + btNt 3 +Kt+1 (6)
where ct, dt and bt denote consumption at period 2, 3 and 4 of life. Dividing by
Nt 1 allows us to rewrite the resource constraint in intensive terms:
F

kt; 1 +

n

= ct +
dt
n
+
bt
n2
+ nkt+1 (7)
2.3 Markets
We suppose that the economy is perfectly competitive, so that production fac-
tors are paid at their marginal productivity. Given that Lt   Nt 2 = Nt 1
and that kt  KtNt 1 = KtLt Nt 2 , we have:
wt =
@F (Kt; Lt)
@Lt
=
@ (Lt   Nt 2)F

Kt
Lt Nt 2 ;
Lt
Lt Nt 2

@Lt
=
h
F

kt; 1 +

n

  ktFk

kt; 1 +

n
i  n
n+ 

(8)
Rt =
@F (Kt; Lt)
@Kt
=
@Nt 1F
 
kt; 1 +

n

@Nt 1kt
= Fk

kt; 1 +

n

(9)
where wt denotes the wage rate and Rt is the return on savings at period t.
We also suppose that there exists a perfect annuity market with actuarially
fair returns, so that the gross return on savings R^t equals:
R^t =
Rt

(10)
3 The laissez-faire
The second-period budget constraint is:
ct + st = wt (11)
where st is savings in the rst period of labor.
The third-period budget constraint is:
dt+1 + zt+1 = wt+1 + stRt+1 (12)
The fourth-period budget constraint is:
bt+2 =
zt+1Rt+2

(13)
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where zt+1 is savings in second period of labor.
Hence the intertemporal budget constraint is:
ct +
dt+1
Rt+1
+
bt+2
Rt+1Rt+2
= wt +
wt+1
Rt+1
(14)
Conditionally on beliefs on future factor prices wet+1, R
e
t+1 and R
e
t+2, the
problem of individuals can be written as:
max
ct;dt+1;bt+2
u (ct) + u(dt+1) + 
2u (bt+2)
s.t. wt +
wet+1
Ret+1
= ct +
dt+1
Ret+1
+
bt+2
Ret+1R
e
t+2
The rst-order conditions yield:
u0(ct)
u0(dt+1)
= Ret+1 (15)
u0(dt+1)
u0 (bt+2)
= Ret+2 (16)
Individuals save in such a way as to equalize the marginal rate of substitution
of two successive periods with the expected rate of return on savings. Higher
impatience (i.e. a lower ) pushes, for a given interest factor, towards more
consumption early in life.
4 The long-run social optimum
Let us now focus on the long-run social optimum in our economy. We will
follow here Samuelsons approach (Samuelson 1975), which consists in studying
the problem of a social planner choosing consumptions, capital and fertility, in
such a way as to maximize the expected lifetime welfare of an agent living at
the stationary equilibrium.1
4.1 The social planners problem
Let us assume that there exists a unique stable stationary equilibrium in our
economy. The social planners problem can be written as follows:
max
c;d;b;k;n
u(c) + u(d) + 2u (b)
s.t. F

k; 1 +

n

= c+
d
n
+
b
n2
+ nk
1Note that this objective is here similar to maximizing the average ex post (i.e. realized)
lifetime well-being among agents living at the steady-state (some agents being short-lived,
whereas others are long-lived).
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An interior optimum (c; d; b; k; n) satises the following FOCs:
u0(c)
u0(d)
=
u0(d)
u0 (b)
= n (17)
Fk

k; 1 +

n

= n (18)
k +
FL
 
k; 1 + n

(n)2
=
d
(n)2
+
2b
(n)3
(19)
The rst condition states that, at the long-run social optimum, the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption at two successive periods is equal to
the optimal fertility rate. The second condition is the standard Golden Rule of
capital accumulation (Phelps 1961), stating that the optimal capital equalizes
the marginal productivity of capital net of depreciation and the fertility rate.
The third condition characterizes the (interior) socially optimal fertility rate. It
depends on three forces. When  is equal to zero, so that only young adults
are productive, the optimal fertility rate equalizes, at the margin, the capital
dilution e¤ect or Solow e¤ect (rst term of LHS) with the intergenerational
distribution e¤ect or Samuelson e¤ect (RHS). The Solow e¤ect states that, under
a higher fertility, it is more di¢ cult to sustain a large capital to labor ratio at the
stationary equilibrium. This e¤ect pushes towards less fertility. The Samuelson
e¤ect states that a higher fertility relaxes the economys resource constraint,
by making the elderlys consumption relatively less sizeable. This second e¤ect
pushes towards a higher fertility. Note that the size of this e¤ect depends on
the age-structure, through the parameter .2
But besides those two e¤ects, there is another, third determinant of optimal
fertility, represented by the second term of the LHS. Clearly, if the productivity
of old workers is zero (i.e.  = 0), this third e¤ect is absent, since all productive
workers are young, and thus changing fertility has no e¤ect on the composition
of the labor force. In that case, the optimal fertility equalizes, at the margin,
the capital dilution e¤ect and the Samuelson e¤ect, as in Samuelsons pioneer
work (Samuelson 1975). However, under  > 0, a third e¤ect is at work. Given
that this e¤ect depends on the composition of the labor force by age, let us call
this e¤ect the "labor age-composition e¤ect".
To understand this labor age-composition e¤ect, note rst that an increase
in n reduces the total amount of labor per young worker, and, hence, reduces the
output per young worker. Thus the immediate e¤ect of a rise in n is a fall of the
ratio total labor force / young workers (i.e. Nt 1+Nt 2Nt 1 =
n+
n ), which leads
to a fall of productivity per young worker. Note, however, that the size of this
negative productivity e¤ect depends itself on the extent of decay in old workers
skills. Obviously, as already mentioned, when  = 0, a rise in the fertility rate
has no e¤ect on productivity per young worker. However, when  > 0, a rise
in n will a¤ect the ratio total labor force / young workers, leading to a varia-
tion in productivity per young worker. Given that the total e¤ect is equal to
2The necessity to raise fertility when longevity increases raise the number of inactive per-
sons is also emphasized in Sauvy (1959).
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FL(k;1+ n )
(n)2 , an important question that arises is whether this term is increas-
ing or decreasing in . We know that it is equal to 0 when  equals 0. However,
a rise in  tends to increase the rst term of the product FL
 
k; 1 + n

, and
to reduce the second term of the product FL
 
k; 1 + n

. We thus have two
opposite inuences of decay on the size of the labor composition e¤ect. When
the rst inuence dominates the second, a larger decay of old workers skills
(i.e. a lower ) contributes to reduce the negative productivity e¤ect induced
by a higher n, leading, ceteris paribus, to a higher optimal fertility n. But
when the second inuence dominates the rst, a larger decay raises the negative
productivity e¤ect induced by a higher n, leading, ceteris paribus, to a lower
optimal fertility n.
When Sauvy (1962) argued that the ageing of the workforce could lead to
an ageing of production techniques, and, hence, to a reduction of total labor
productivity, he probably had in mind that an increase in the degree of decay
in old workers skills would necessarily make a quicker renewal of the work-
force more desirable, leading to a larger socially desirable fertility. This way of
thinking is quite intuitive: when old workersskill become more old-fashioned
or depreciated, it makes sense to desire a higher fertility rate. This kind of
rationale is possible in our framework, through the labor age-composition ef-
fect, but provided the fundamentals of the economy are such that the product
FL
 
k; 1 + n

is indeed increasing with . Otherwise, when the product
FL
 
k; 1 + n

is decreasing with , a higher decay justies a lower fertility,
unlike Sauvys intuition.
In the light of all this, the interior optimal fertility rate equalizes at the
margin, on the one hand, the sum of the capital dilution e¤ect and the labor
composition e¤ect, and, on the other hand, the intergenerational redistribution
e¤ect. Those three e¤ects can also be called, respectively, the Solow e¤ect, the
Sauvy e¤ect and the Samuelson e¤ect. It is thus possible, by merely introducing
two generations of workers and the possibility of decay of old workers skills, to
incorporate Sauvys intuitions into the neoclassical model of optimal fertility.
Finally, it should be stressed that our discussion assumed implicitly that
the optimal fertility rate is an interior optimum. As this is well-known in the
literature (see Deardor¤ 1976, Michel and Pestieau 1993), the optimum fertility
rate in a Samuelsonian economy is not necessary an interior one. As shown
by Michel and Pestieau (1993), interiority holds only when there is enough
complementarity between consumption at the di¤erent ages of life, and when
there is enough complementarity between capital and labor in the production
process.
Two kinds of corner solutions can arise. First, it can be the case that:
k +
FL
 
k; 1 + n

(n)2
>
d
(n)2
+
2b
(n)3
(20)
for any value of n, in which case the marginal utility gain from increasing
fertility associated to the Samuelson e¤ect is always lower than the marginal
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utility loss due to the capital dilution e¤ect and the labor age-composition ef-
fect, implying that the optimal fertility rate is equal to 0. This case arises when
consumptions at the old age do not really matter for individual well-being (be-
cause of a high elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption), which
pushes the intergenerational redistribution e¤ect down.
On the contrary, when we have
k +
FL
 
k; 1 + n

(n)2
<
d
(n)2
+
2b
(n)3
(21)
for any value of n, the solution is the other corner: the optimal fertility is
innite. Indeed, in that case, the welfare loss from increasing fertility associ-
ated to the capital dilution e¤ect is, whatever the level of fertility, lower than
the marginal utility gain from increasing fertility due to the intergenerational
redistribution e¤ect. In that case, the low impact of capital dilution can arise
from the high degree of substitutability between capital and labor, which makes
further rises in fertility always benecial.
Those two corner solutions look pathological, but, as we shall see when cal-
ibrating the model, corner solutions arise quite often when considering optimal
fertility in a Samuelsonian economy, in line with what Michel and Pestieau
(1993) proved analytically.
4.2 The Serendipity Theorem
First stated by Samuelson (1975), the Serendipity Theorem states that, if there
exists a unique stable stationary equilibrium in a two-period OLG model with
physical capital, then the perfectly competitive economy will converge towards
the long-run social optimum provided the optimal fertility rate is imposed on
individuals.
Does this result still hold in our four-period OLG setting? To check this, let
us rewrite the problem of individuals living at the steady-state. That problem
is:
max
c;d;b
u (c) + u(d) + 2u (b)
s.t. w +
w
R
= c+
d
R
+
b
R2
The rst-order conditions yield:
u0(c)
u0(d)
=
u0(d)
u0 (b)
= R (22)
Hence, if the social planner xes n such that Fk
 
k; 1 + n

= n where k
takes its socially optimal level, then individuals, being price-takers, will choose
their savings optimally, since the above FOC will then coïncide with the FOC
of the social optimum.
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5 Numerical illustrations
In his report, Sauvy argued that fertility in Wallonia was suboptimal, and that
this should be raised by 20 %. This section aims at providing answers to the
following questions. On the basis of the model developed above, was Sauvy
right when claiming that the actual fertility rate in Wallonia in 1950s and 1960s
was below the socially optimum one? What about the recommendation of a 20
% rise in fertility?
In order to answer that question, this section calibrates the model presented
above, and nd the optimal fertility rate. It is then compared with the one
prevailing in Wallonia at that time, and with the one recommended by Sauvy.
5.1 Data
At this stage, it is worth looking at the dynamics of fertility in Belgian regions
since the 19th century. As shown by Capron et al (1998), the total fertility rate
(TFR) has strongly declined in Wallonia since 1800. At that time, the TFR
was about 4.5 children per women. The decline was rst smooth, with about 4
children per women in 1860, but then strongly declined, to reach 2 children per
women in 1930. Then, the TFR uctuated between 2.5 in 1960 to reach 1.5 in
the early 1980s.
Figure 1: TFR in Flanders and Wallonia (Source: Capron et al 1998 p. 264).
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Flanderss TFR followed a quite di¤erent dynamics: it declined slightly in
the rst part of the 19th century, but, then, it grew to reach about 4.7 children
per women in 1880. In 1900, the fertility gap between Flanders and Wallonia
was equal to about 1.5 children per women. That gap has reduced progressively
after 1900, when FlandersTFR has progressively converged towards the one
prevailing in Wallonia. Note that, in 1960, the TFR in Flanders was still superior
to the one prevailing in Wallonia (2.8 against 2.5 children per women).
5.2 Functional forms
In order to check to what extent fertility in Wallonia around 1960 can be re-
garded as suboptimal from the perspective of the model developed above, we
need rst to impose some particular functional forms on the utility function and
the production function.
Regarding the temporal utility function, we use the standard CIES form:
u (ct) =
c
1  1
t
1  1
(23)
where  > 0 and  6= 0:
From the FOCs for optimal consumption proles, we have c
  1

t
d
  1

t
= n and
d
  1

t
b
  1

t
= n, from which we obtain:
ct =
h
nd
  1
t
i 
and bt =
"
d
  1
t
n
# 
Substituting for those expressions in the economys resource constraint yields:
F

kt; 1 +

n

=
h
nd
  1
t
i 
+
dt
n
+

d
  1

t
n
 

n2
+ nkt (24)
The production function takes a CES form:
F (Kt; Lt) = A

K t + (1  )L t
 1=
(25)
where A > 0, 0 <  < 1,  >  1,  6= 0. Assuming a full depreciation of capital
after one period, output per young worker is here:
yt  Yt
Nt 1
=
A

 (Nt 1kt)
 
+ (1  )

Nt 1 +
Nt 1
n
  1=
Nt 1
= A

 (kt)
 
+ (1  )

1 +

n
  1=
(26)
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Hence we have
Fk

kt; 1 +

n

= A

 (kt)
 
+ (1  )

1 +

n
  (1=) 1
 (kt)
  1 (27)
FL

kt; 1 +

n

=
h
F

kt; 1 +

n

  ktFk

k; 1 +

n
i  n
n+ 

=

n
n+ 
264 A
h
 (kt)
 
+ (1  )  1 + n i 1=
 A
h
 (kt)
 
+ (1  )  1 + n i (1=) 1  (kt) 
375(28)
Hence, from the Golden Rule, we have:
n = A

 (kt)
 
+ (1  )

1 +

n
  (1=) 1
 (kt)
  1
() kt =

n
A
 1
2   
(1  )  1 + n 1 (29)
Thus, for any level of fertility n, we can deduce the optimal level of k by
means of the Golden Rule expression. Then, given the levels of n and k, the
new formulation of the resource constraint yields a unique level of second-period
consumption d, from which we can nd the remaining variables c and b.3
5.3 Calibration
The model is a 4-period model. Each period lasts 20 years. Regarding the
survival probability , we use life expectancy estimates around 1960. Life ex-
pectancy in 1960 is equal, for both men and women, to 69.63 years. This implies
that  is equal to 9:63=20 = 0:48.
Let us now calibrate preference parameters. Regarding the time preference
parameter , we use the standard approach in the literature: given a quarterly
discount factor equal to 0.99, we obtain  = (0:99)80 = 0:45: Regarding ,
we use the empirical estimates of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
According to Browning at al (1999), the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
is slightly above unity. We take here the estimate of Blundell et al (1994) and
x  = 1:25.
3 Indeed, from the resource constraint, we have:
F

k; 1 +

n

=
h
nd 
1

i 
+
d
n
+
"
d
  1

t
n
# 

n2
+ nk
() d = F
 
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  nk"
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#
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As far as the production process is concerned, three parameters must be
calibrated: A,  and . In order to calibrate those parameters, we follow de la
Croix and Michel (2002, p. 340), who calibrate jointly those three parameters.
Those authors x A = 20 and  = 1, which implies an elasticity if substitution
between capital and labor equal to 0:50. Finally, in order to obtain a labor share
in production equal to 2/3, those authors x  = 0:49.
We need also to calibrate the depreciation of physical capital  and the
depreciation of human skills . Regarding physical capital depreciation, we as-
sume, given the duration of periods (20 years), that there is full depreciation
of capital after one period of use (i.e.  = 1). Regarding the parameter of old
workers skills decay , empirical studies on the age/productivity relation are far
from unanimous, as discussed in the recent study by van Ours and Stoeldraijer
(2010). Those authors highlight that the existing literature presents quite con-
tradictory results on the age/productivity relationship. According to Johnson
(1993), most employers and employees believe that average labor productivity
declines after some age between ages 40 and 50. Skirbekk (2003) argues that job
performance declines after age 50. But Aubert and Crépon (2007) found that
productivity increases until age 40-45 and then remains stable after that age.
Finally, Göbel and Zwick (2009) nd that productivity grows until age 40-45,
and then stabilizes until age 60. Given those contradicting results, we will take
 = 1 as a benchmark case, and consider alternative values for  as a way to
show how Sauvys intuition can a¤ect optimal fertility in our model.
The following table summarizes the calibration of parameters taken as a
benchmark.
parameters     A   
values 1.00 0.45 1.25 0.48 20 0.49 1.00 1.00
5.4 Results
This subsection computes the socially optimal fertility rate in our economy, and
compares it with the actual fertility rate for Wallonia in 1960, equal to 2.6
children per women, which, in normalized terms, is equal to n = 1:3. For that
purpose, we will proceed as follows. For each possible fertility rate within a
biologically feasible interval n 2 [0; 6], we derive the associated optimal level
of k, and, then, the optimal levels of c, d and b, as well as the associated
average lifetime welfare. We then naturally nd the level of fertility which
leads to the maximum average lifetime well-being, and we compare it with the
actual fertility. We then repeat that procedure for di¤erent sets of structural
parameters, to assess the robustness of our results.
A rst important numerical result is the fact that, under the benchmark
calibration proposed in the previous subsection, the optimal fertility rate is a
corner solution at n = 0, whatever the postulated level of old skillsdecay ()
is. This rst result is shown on Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Average lifetime welfare as a function of fertility n and
decay  (benchmark values).
This result, which may appear surprising at rst glance, is not surprising
for economists studying optimal fertility in an OLG setting. Indeed, since the
study by Michel and Pestieau (1993), economists know that the existence of
an interior optimal fertility rate within a Diamond-type economy requires that
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is su¢ ciently low and that comple-
mentarity between capital and labor is su¢ ciently high. However, given the
postulated parametersvalues, there remains too much substitutability, leading
to a corner solution for fertility.
Let us now consider alternative calibrations, involving a lower value of the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution . As shown on Figure 3 (where axes
are reversed given the negative utility), assuming  = 0:5 allows us to obtain
an interior optimal fertility rate. Under  = 1 (no decay), the optimal fertility
is 0:5. The optimal n becomes slightly larger, equal to 0:6, when  decreases to
0:6. Note that the impact of  on the optimal fertility is non-monotonic, since
for  = 0:1 the optimal fertility goes back to 0:5. This result is in line with
the theoretical discussion we had above. Since the product FL
 
k; 1 + n

is
non-monotonic in , there is no reason to expect that the optimal fertility rate
is necessarily increasing with the extent of decay in old workers skills. Having
stressed this, it remains true, in any case, that the optimal fertility is far lower
than the one prevailing in Wallonia at that time (i.e. n = 1:3).
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Figure 3: Average lifetime welfare as a function of fertility (n)
and decay (), under  = 0:5:
Note that taking even lower values for  does not substantially a¤ect our
results. Under  = 0:2, the optimal fertility rate equals 0:8 when  = 1, rises
to 0:9 when  = 0:9, but then goes down to 0:7 when  = 0:1. Hence it
appears, here again, that taking into account the decay of old workers skills
does not su¢ ce, on its own, to lead to a large optimal fertility rate. This
result is robust, and prevails even when we reduce strongly the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution. One reason for this low level of optimal fertility lies
in the relatively high level of impatience (i.e.  = 0:45), which, by construction,
has the e¤ect to weaken the strength of the Samuelson e¤ect, and, hence, pushes
optimal fertility down.
In the light of this, it seems hard to reconcile Sauvys recommendation with
the predictions of the model. True, it is possible, in theory, to account for the
intuition that a higher decay of old workers skills may lead, in some cases, to
justify a higher fertility rate. However, our numerical exercise suggests that, for
reasonable values of the structural parameters, we obtain optimal fertility rates
that are far below the one prevailing in Wallonia in 1950s and 1960s. Thus our
numerical ndings to not seem to support Sauvys recommendation.
Finally, let us notice that, on the basis of the actual life expectancy prevailing
in Wallonia, i.e. 79 years, implying  equal to 19/20 = 0.95), the optimal fertility
still remains, under  = 0:8, quite low, and between 0.2 (when  = 1) and 0.5
(when  = 0:3). Thus better survival conditions push, ceteris paribus, towards a
higher optimal fertility, by reinforcing Samuelsons e¤ect. However, even under
a high decay of old workersskills, it is hard to regard fertility encouragement
as welfare-improving in the long-run in our rst-best setting.
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Figure 4: Average lifetime welfare as a function of fertility () and
decay (n), under  = 0:8 and  = 0:95 (contemporary survival
conditions).
6 Conclusions
In sum, this paper provides a contrasted view on Sauvys diagnosis on Walloon
fertility in the early 1960s. True, it is possible to incorporate Sauvys view on
ageing of workers and productivity within a simple OLG model à la Samuelson.
Once taking the decay of human skills into account, the optimal fertility rate
equalizes, at the margin, the sum of the capital dilution e¤ect (Solow e¤ect)
and the labor age-composition e¤ect (Sauvy e¤ect) with the intergenerational
redistribution e¤ect (Samuelson e¤ect). There is thus some simple way to ac-
count for issues of old workers productivity when discussing optimal fertility in
a Samuelsonian economy.
However, when turning to numbers, it appears that even large levels of decay
in old workersskills do not su¢ ce to support Sauvys views on Walloon fertility.
Our numerical simulations suggest that, even though a higher extent of decay
leads, in general (but not always), to a larger optimal fertility, the levels of
optimal fertility rates remain far below the observed ones, and also below the
ones recommended by Sauvy in his report.
One should not take these results as a criticism of Sauvys thought on pop-
ulation. Quite the contrary, our calculations suggest that the rationale used by
Sauvy to dene the optimal fertility could not take, as a unique social objective,
the maximization of average social welfare in Wallonia at that time. Obviously,
some other considerations, either for numbers, or for culture and knowledge, or
16
for what he called power, were playing a role in his recommendations. Hence,
before saying that he was right or wrong, we need rst to consider how those
other concerns could be properly included in an exhaustive economic analysis
of optimal fertility. This remains to be done.
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1 Introduction
Published in 1962, the o¢ cial report written by the French demographer Alfred
Sauvy concluded that the level of fertility in Wallonia was too low in comparison
with what would be the socially optimal fertility level. According to Sauvy, the
too low fertility level in Wallonia at that time led to a too low proportion
of young workers with respect to older workers. As a consequence, Wallonias
economy was, in Sauvys own words, peopled of old workers having old thoughts
in old houses. In the light of this observation, Sauvy recommended a 20 % rise
in the fertility level of Wallonia, in such a way as to maintain the dynamism of
the Walloon economy.
Undoubtedly, Sauvys views on what constitutes the "optimal fertility" are
deep, and cannot be summarized in one single formula. According to his Theorie
Générale de la Population (1956, chapter 4), there exist not one, but several
possible social objectives to be used to dene what one means by an optimal
fertility. One could take, for instance, not only total or average welfare (as
economists often do), but, also, the total quantity of life, the total population
size, the development of culture and knowledge, the promotion of longevity and
health, and also power (available means to be a¤ected to some goal, military or
not). Thus there exist, according to Sauvy, lots of ways to dene the goal with
respect to which some fertility can be regarded as "optimal".
The objective of this paper is to reconsider Sauvys view on optimal fertility
within a formal model. Our purpose is to try to incorporate Sauvys view as
expressed in his 1962 report in standard optimal fertility models in economics,
taking social welfare as a goal.
The economic theory of optimal fertility dates back to Samuelsons (1975)
seminal paper, where he characterized the optimal fertility rate in a Diamond-
type 2-period OLG economy with physical capital accumulation. Samuelson
showed there that the interior optimal fertility rate, when it exists, equalizes,
at the margin, two e¤ects: on the one hand, the capital dilution e¤ect (or
Solow e¤ect), according to which a higher fertility rate makes it more di¢ cult
to sustain a high steady-state capital to labor ratio; on the other hand, the
intergenerational redistribution e¤ect (also called Samuelson e¤ect), according
to which a higher fertility, by reducing the demographic weight of the elderly,
contributes to relax the economys resource constraint by reducing the weight
of the elderlys consumption. Following Samuelson, several papers analyzed the
conditions under which an interior optimal fertility rate exists in the standard
Samuelsonian economy (see Deardor¤ 1976, Michel and Pestieau 1993), or in
other economies, with, for example, endogenous fertility choices (Abio 2003),
risky lifetime (de la Croix et al 2012) and several fertility periods (Pestieau and
Ponthiere 2014).
Our goal is to extend the standard Samuelsonian economy to examine the
impact of old workers skills decay on the socially optimal fertility. Our ques-
tions are the following. Is it possible, within a simple Samuelsonian model, to
do justice to Sauvys intuition, according to which an older labor force justies a
higher optimal fertility? Was Sauvy right in his diagnosis on the suboptimality
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of fertility in Wallonia? In order to answer those questions, we proceed in two
stages. First, we develop a simple 4-period OLG model with capital accumula-
tion. A specicity of our model with respect to Samuelsons framework is that
there exists not one, but two generations of workers (young and old), the skills
of the latter being subject to some form of decay. We then use that model to
characterize the optimal fertility rate, and study then the impact of skills decay
on its level. Second, we calibrate that model using general functional form for
utility functions and production functions, and compare the optimal fertility
levels with Sauvys recommendations.
Anticipating our results, we show, when characterizing the optimal fertility
level, that this equalizes, at the margin, the sum of the capital dilution e¤ect
(Solow e¤ect) and the labor age-composition e¤ect (Sauvy e¤ect) with the in-
tergenerational redistribution e¤ect (Samuelson e¤ect). Hence, it is, in theory,
possible to reconcile Sauvys views with standard economic views on optimal
fertility. Note, however, that, in theory, the impact of the decay in skills on
optimal fertility is not monotonous, and depends strongly on the economic fun-
damentals. Thus, although Sauvys views that a higher decay justies a higher
fertility can be rationalized in some cases, there exist also cases in theory where
a higher degree of decay does not lead to a higher optimal fertility. On the em-
pirical side, our numerical simulations suggest that, for standard values of the
structural parameters of the economy, it is extremely di¢ cult to reconcile our
framework with Sauvys views. Our analysis suggests that the socially optimal
fertility rate is lower than the one observed in Wallonia at the time of Sauvys
report, and thus we cannot nd support for his recommendation.
In sum, although Sauvys intuitions can be incorporated in the theoretical
analysis of optimal fertility, and although a higher decay of old workersskills
can, in theory, lead to a higher optimal fertility rate, our numerical analysis
does not seem to support Sauvys views on the suboptimal level of fertility in
Wallonia in the 1950s and 1960s.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
The laissez-faire is derived in Section 3. The optimal fertility rate is charac-
terized in Section 4. Section 5 provides some numerical simulations. Section 6
concludes.
2 The model
We consider a four-period OLG model with physical capital accumulation. Time
goes from 0 to +1. The duration of each period is normalized to one. The
rst period is childhood. The second period is young adulthood, during which
each individual works, saves, consumes and has n children. The third period is
a period during which individuals work, save and consume. Finally, the fourth
period is the old age, during which individuals enjoy their savings. That period
is lived through a probability .
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2.1 Demography and labour force
The population size follows the dynamic law:
Nt+1 = nNt (1)
where Nt denotes the number of individuals born at period t, while n is the
fertility rate.
The total labour force at time t, denoted by Lt, is equal to:
Lt = Nt 1 + Nt 2 (2)
where  2 [0; 1] captures the extent of decay in the skills of old workers. When
! 0, old workers have a very low productivity in comparison to young workers.
On the contrary, when  ! 1, old workers are almost as productive as young
workers. This gap in productivity between the young and the old may be due
to lots of di¤erent causes. One obvious cause lies in the fact, emphasized by
Boucekkine et al (2002), that the education of old workers dates back to a
more distant epoch, which can make their skills relatively out of date. Thus
our modelling of labor can be regarded as a reduced form of the continuous
time vintage human capital economy considered in Boucekkine et al (2002),
which is here simplied by the fact that we do not take education choices into
account, but, rather, suppose that time naturally depreciates human skills and
productivity. One could reply to this argument that, under standard learning
by doing, we should have  > 1 instead of   1, since workers are learning
how to better produce over time, and thus would become more productive with
the age. We will further discuss the link between age and productivity when we
will calibrate the model in Section 5.
Using the law for population dynamics, total labour can be rewritten as:
Lt = nNt 2 + Nt 2
= Nt 2 (n+ ) (3)
2.2 Production
The production of an output Yt involves capital Kt and labor Lt, according to
the function:
Yt = F (Kt; Lt) = F (Kt; Lt) + (1  )Kt (4)
where  is the depreciation rate of capital. The production function F (Kt; Lt)
is supposed to be homogeneous of degree 1. Thus the total production function
F (Kt; Lt) is also homogeneous of degree 1. The production process can be
rewritten in intensive terms as:
yt = F

kt;
Nt 2 (n+ )
Nt 2n

= F

kt; 1 +

n

(5)
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where yt  YtNt 1 denotes the output per young worker, whereas kt  KtNt 1
denotes the capital stock per young worker.
The resource constraint of the economy is:
F (Kt; Lt) = ctNt 1 + dtNt 2 + btNt 3 +Kt+1 (6)
where ct, dt and bt denote consumption at period 2, 3 and 4 of life. Dividing by
Nt 1 allows us to rewrite the resource constraint in intensive terms:
F

kt; 1 +

n

= ct +
dt
n
+
bt
n2
+ nkt+1 (7)
2.3 Markets
We suppose that the economy is perfectly competitive, so that production fac-
tors are paid at their marginal productivity. Given that Lt   Nt 2 = Nt 1
and that kt  KtNt 1 = KtLt Nt 2 , we have:
wt =
@F (Kt; Lt)
@Lt
=
@ (Lt   Nt 2)F

Kt
Lt Nt 2 ;
Lt
Lt Nt 2

@Lt
=
h
F

kt; 1 +

n

  ktFk

kt; 1 +

n
i  n
n+ 

(8)
Rt =
@F (Kt; Lt)
@Kt
=
@Nt 1F
 
kt; 1 +

n

@Nt 1kt
= Fk

kt; 1 +

n

(9)
where wt denotes the wage rate and Rt is the return on savings at period t.
We also suppose that there exists a perfect annuity market with actuarially
fair returns, so that the gross return on savings R^t equals:
R^t =
Rt

(10)
3 The laissez-faire
The second-period budget constraint is:
ct + st = wt (11)
where st is savings in the rst period of labor.
The third-period budget constraint is:
dt+1 + zt+1 = wt+1 + stRt+1 (12)
The fourth-period budget constraint is:
bt+2 =
zt+1Rt+2

(13)
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where zt+1 is savings in second period of labor.
Hence the intertemporal budget constraint is:
ct +
dt+1
Rt+1
+
bt+2
Rt+1Rt+2
= wt +
wt+1
Rt+1
(14)
Conditionally on beliefs on future factor prices wet+1, R
e
t+1 and R
e
t+2, the
problem of individuals can be written as:
max
ct;dt+1;bt+2
u (ct) + u(dt+1) + 
2u (bt+2)
s.t. wt +
wet+1
Ret+1
= ct +
dt+1
Ret+1
+
bt+2
Ret+1R
e
t+2
The rst-order conditions yield:
u0(ct)
u0(dt+1)
= Ret+1 (15)
u0(dt+1)
u0 (bt+2)
= Ret+2 (16)
Individuals save in such a way as to equalize the marginal rate of substitution
of two successive periods with the expected rate of return on savings. Higher
impatience (i.e. a lower ) pushes, for a given interest factor, towards more
consumption early in life.
4 The long-run social optimum
Let us now focus on the long-run social optimum in our economy. We will
follow here Samuelsons approach (Samuelson 1975), which consists in studying
the problem of a social planner choosing consumptions, capital and fertility, in
such a way as to maximize the expected lifetime welfare of an agent living at
the stationary equilibrium.1
4.1 The social planners problem
Let us assume that there exists a unique stable stationary equilibrium in our
economy. The social planners problem can be written as follows:
max
c;d;b;k;n
u(c) + u(d) + 2u (b)
s.t. F

k; 1 +

n

= c+
d
n
+
b
n2
+ nk
1Note that this objective is here similar to maximizing the average ex post (i.e. realized)
lifetime well-being among agents living at the steady-state (some agents being short-lived,
whereas others are long-lived).
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An interior optimum (c; d; b; k; n) satises the following FOCs:
u0(c)
u0(d)
=
u0(d)
u0 (b)
= n (17)
Fk

k; 1 +

n

= n (18)
k +
FL
 
k; 1 + n

(n)2
=
d
(n)2
+
2b
(n)3
(19)
The rst condition states that, at the long-run social optimum, the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption at two successive periods is equal to
the optimal fertility rate. The second condition is the standard Golden Rule of
capital accumulation (Phelps 1961), stating that the optimal capital equalizes
the marginal productivity of capital net of depreciation and the fertility rate.
The third condition characterizes the (interior) socially optimal fertility rate. It
depends on three forces. When  is equal to zero, so that only young adults
are productive, the optimal fertility rate equalizes, at the margin, the capital
dilution e¤ect or Solow e¤ect (rst term of LHS) with the intergenerational
distribution e¤ect or Samuelson e¤ect (RHS). The Solow e¤ect states that, under
a higher fertility, it is more di¢ cult to sustain a large capital to labor ratio at the
stationary equilibrium. This e¤ect pushes towards less fertility. The Samuelson
e¤ect states that a higher fertility relaxes the economys resource constraint,
by making the elderlys consumption relatively less sizeable. This second e¤ect
pushes towards a higher fertility. Note that the size of this e¤ect depends on
the age-structure, through the parameter .2
But besides those two e¤ects, there is another, third determinant of optimal
fertility, represented by the second term of the LHS. Clearly, if the productivity
of old workers is zero (i.e.  = 0), this third e¤ect is absent, since all productive
workers are young, and thus changing fertility has no e¤ect on the composition
of the labor force. In that case, the optimal fertility equalizes, at the margin,
the capital dilution e¤ect and the Samuelson e¤ect, as in Samuelsons pioneer
work (Samuelson 1975). However, under  > 0, a third e¤ect is at work. Given
that this e¤ect depends on the composition of the labor force by age, let us call
this e¤ect the "labor age-composition e¤ect".
To understand this labor age-composition e¤ect, note rst that an increase
in n reduces the total amount of labor per young worker, and, hence, reduces the
output per young worker. Thus the immediate e¤ect of a rise in n is a fall of the
ratio total labor force / young workers (i.e. Nt 1+Nt 2Nt 1 =
n+
n ), which leads
to a fall of productivity per young worker. Note, however, that the size of this
negative productivity e¤ect depends itself on the extent of decay in old workers
skills. Obviously, as already mentioned, when  = 0, a rise in the fertility rate
has no e¤ect on productivity per young worker. However, when  > 0, a rise
in n will a¤ect the ratio total labor force / young workers, leading to a varia-
tion in productivity per young worker. Given that the total e¤ect is equal to
2The necessity to raise fertility when longevity increases raise the number of inactive per-
sons is also emphasized in Sauvy (1959).
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FL(k;1+ n )
(n)2 , an important question that arises is whether this term is increas-
ing or decreasing in . We know that it is equal to 0 when  equals 0. However,
a rise in  tends to increase the rst term of the product FL
 
k; 1 + n

, and
to reduce the second term of the product FL
 
k; 1 + n

. We thus have two
opposite inuences of decay on the size of the labor composition e¤ect. When
the rst inuence dominates the second, a larger decay of old workers skills
(i.e. a lower ) contributes to reduce the negative productivity e¤ect induced
by a higher n, leading, ceteris paribus, to a higher optimal fertility n. But
when the second inuence dominates the rst, a larger decay raises the negative
productivity e¤ect induced by a higher n, leading, ceteris paribus, to a lower
optimal fertility n.
When Sauvy (1962) argued that the ageing of the workforce could lead to
an ageing of production techniques, and, hence, to a reduction of total labor
productivity, he probably had in mind that an increase in the degree of decay
in old workers skills would necessarily make a quicker renewal of the work-
force more desirable, leading to a larger socially desirable fertility. This way of
thinking is quite intuitive: when old workersskill become more old-fashioned
or depreciated, it makes sense to desire a higher fertility rate. This kind of
rationale is possible in our framework, through the labor age-composition ef-
fect, but provided the fundamentals of the economy are such that the product
FL
 
k; 1 + n

is indeed increasing with . Otherwise, when the product
FL
 
k; 1 + n

is decreasing with , a higher decay justies a lower fertility,
unlike Sauvys intuition.
In the light of all this, the interior optimal fertility rate equalizes at the
margin, on the one hand, the sum of the capital dilution e¤ect and the labor
composition e¤ect, and, on the other hand, the intergenerational redistribution
e¤ect. Those three e¤ects can also be called, respectively, the Solow e¤ect, the
Sauvy e¤ect and the Samuelson e¤ect. It is thus possible, by merely introducing
two generations of workers and the possibility of decay of old workers skills, to
incorporate Sauvys intuitions into the neoclassical model of optimal fertility.
Finally, it should be stressed that our discussion assumed implicitly that
the optimal fertility rate is an interior optimum. As this is well-known in the
literature (see Deardor¤ 1976, Michel and Pestieau 1993), the optimum fertility
rate in a Samuelsonian economy is not necessary an interior one. As shown
by Michel and Pestieau (1993), interiority holds only when there is enough
complementarity between consumption at the di¤erent ages of life, and when
there is enough complementarity between capital and labor in the production
process.
Two kinds of corner solutions can arise. First, it can be the case that:
k +
FL
 
k; 1 + n

(n)2
>
d
(n)2
+
2b
(n)3
(20)
for any value of n, in which case the marginal utility gain from increasing
fertility associated to the Samuelson e¤ect is always lower than the marginal
8
utility loss due to the capital dilution e¤ect and the labor age-composition ef-
fect, implying that the optimal fertility rate is equal to 0. This case arises when
consumptions at the old age do not really matter for individual well-being (be-
cause of a high elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption), which
pushes the intergenerational redistribution e¤ect down.
On the contrary, when we have
k +
FL
 
k; 1 + n

(n)2
<
d
(n)2
+
2b
(n)3
(21)
for any value of n, the solution is the other corner: the optimal fertility is
innite. Indeed, in that case, the welfare loss from increasing fertility associ-
ated to the capital dilution e¤ect is, whatever the level of fertility, lower than
the marginal utility gain from increasing fertility due to the intergenerational
redistribution e¤ect. In that case, the low impact of capital dilution can arise
from the high degree of substitutability between capital and labor, which makes
further rises in fertility always benecial.
Those two corner solutions look pathological, but, as we shall see when cal-
ibrating the model, corner solutions arise quite often when considering optimal
fertility in a Samuelsonian economy, in line with what Michel and Pestieau
(1993) proved analytically.
4.2 The Serendipity Theorem
First stated by Samuelson (1975), the Serendipity Theorem states that, if there
exists a unique stable stationary equilibrium in a two-period OLG model with
physical capital, then the perfectly competitive economy will converge towards
the long-run social optimum provided the optimal fertility rate is imposed on
individuals.
Does this result still hold in our four-period OLG setting? To check this, let
us rewrite the problem of individuals living at the steady-state. That problem
is:
max
c;d;b
u (c) + u(d) + 2u (b)
s.t. w +
w
R
= c+
d
R
+
b
R2
The rst-order conditions yield:
u0(c)
u0(d)
=
u0(d)
u0 (b)
= R (22)
Hence, if the social planner xes n such that Fk
 
k; 1 + n

= n where k
takes its socially optimal level, then individuals, being price-takers, will choose
their savings optimally, since the above FOC will then coïncide with the FOC
of the social optimum.
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5 Numerical illustrations
In his report, Sauvy argued that fertility in Wallonia was suboptimal, and that
this should be raised by 20 %. This section aims at providing answers to the
following questions. On the basis of the model developed above, was Sauvy
right when claiming that the actual fertility rate in Wallonia in 1950s and 1960s
was below the socially optimum one? What about the recommendation of a 20
% rise in fertility?
In order to answer that question, this section calibrates the model presented
above, and nd the optimal fertility rate. It is then compared with the one
prevailing in Wallonia at that time, and with the one recommended by Sauvy.
5.1 Data
At this stage, it is worth looking at the dynamics of fertility in Belgian regions
since the 19th century. As shown by Capron et al (1998), the total fertility rate
(TFR) has strongly declined in Wallonia since 1800. At that time, the TFR
was about 4.5 children per women. The decline was rst smooth, with about 4
children per women in 1860, but then strongly declined, to reach 2 children per
women in 1930. Then, the TFR uctuated between 2.5 in 1960 to reach 1.5 in
the early 1980s.
Figure 1: TFR in Flanders and Wallonia (Source: Capron et al 1998 p. 264).
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Flanderss TFR followed a quite di¤erent dynamics: it declined slightly in
the rst part of the 19th century, but, then, it grew to reach about 4.7 children
per women in 1880. In 1900, the fertility gap between Flanders and Wallonia
was equal to about 1.5 children per women. That gap has reduced progressively
after 1900, when FlandersTFR has progressively converged towards the one
prevailing in Wallonia. Note that, in 1960, the TFR in Flanders was still superior
to the one prevailing in Wallonia (2.8 against 2.5 children per women).
5.2 Functional forms
In order to check to what extent fertility in Wallonia around 1960 can be re-
garded as suboptimal from the perspective of the model developed above, we
need rst to impose some particular functional forms on the utility function and
the production function.
Regarding the temporal utility function, we use the standard CIES form:
u (ct) =
c
1  1
t
1  1
(23)
where  > 0 and  6= 0:
From the FOCs for optimal consumption proles, we have c
  1

t
d
  1

t
= n and
d
  1

t
b
  1

t
= n, from which we obtain:
ct =
h
nd
  1
t
i 
and bt =
"
d
  1
t
n
# 
Substituting for those expressions in the economys resource constraint yields:
F

kt; 1 +

n

=
h
nd
  1
t
i 
+
dt
n
+

d
  1

t
n
 

n2
+ nkt (24)
The production function takes a CES form:
F (Kt; Lt) = A

K t + (1  )L t
 1=
(25)
where A > 0, 0 <  < 1,  >  1,  6= 0. Assuming a full depreciation of capital
after one period, output per young worker is here:
yt  Yt
Nt 1
=
A

 (Nt 1kt)
 
+ (1  )

Nt 1 +
Nt 1
n
  1=
Nt 1
= A

 (kt)
 
+ (1  )

1 +

n
  1=
(26)
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Hence we have
Fk

kt; 1 +

n

= A

 (kt)
 
+ (1  )

1 +

n
  (1=) 1
 (kt)
  1 (27)
FL

kt; 1 +

n

=
h
F

kt; 1 +

n

  ktFk

k; 1 +

n
i  n
n+ 

=

n
n+ 
264 A
h
 (kt)
 
+ (1  )  1 + n i 1=
 A
h
 (kt)
 
+ (1  )  1 + n i (1=) 1  (kt) 
375(28)
Hence, from the Golden Rule, we have:
n = A

 (kt)
 
+ (1  )

1 +

n
  (1=) 1
 (kt)
  1
() kt =

n
A
 1
2   
(1  )  1 + n 1 (29)
Thus, for any level of fertility n, we can deduce the optimal level of k by
means of the Golden Rule expression. Then, given the levels of n and k, the
new formulation of the resource constraint yields a unique level of second-period
consumption d, from which we can nd the remaining variables c and b.3
5.3 Calibration
The model is a 4-period model. Each period lasts 20 years. Regarding the
survival probability , we use life expectancy estimates around 1960. Life ex-
pectancy in 1960 is equal, for both men and women, to 69.63 years. This implies
that  is equal to 9:63=20 = 0:48.
Let us now calibrate preference parameters. Regarding the time preference
parameter , we use the standard approach in the literature: given a quarterly
discount factor equal to 0.99, we obtain  = (0:99)80 = 0:45: Regarding ,
we use the empirical estimates of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
According to Browning at al (1999), the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
is slightly above unity. We take here the estimate of Blundell et al (1994) and
x  = 1:25.
3 Indeed, from the resource constraint, we have:
F

k; 1 +

n

=
h
nd 
1

i 
+
d
n
+
"
d
  1

t
n
# 

n2
+ nk
() d = F
 
k; 1 + 
n
  nk"
[n]  + 1
n
+
h
1
n
i 

n2
#
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As far as the production process is concerned, three parameters must be
calibrated: A,  and . In order to calibrate those parameters, we follow de la
Croix and Michel (2002, p. 340), who calibrate jointly those three parameters.
Those authors x A = 20 and  = 1, which implies an elasticity if substitution
between capital and labor equal to 0:50. Finally, in order to obtain a labor share
in production equal to 2/3, those authors x  = 0:49.
We need also to calibrate the depreciation of physical capital  and the
depreciation of human skills . Regarding physical capital depreciation, we as-
sume, given the duration of periods (20 years), that there is full depreciation
of capital after one period of use (i.e.  = 1). Regarding the parameter of old
workers skills decay , empirical studies on the age/productivity relation are far
from unanimous, as discussed in the recent study by van Ours and Stoeldraijer
(2010). Those authors highlight that the existing literature presents quite con-
tradictory results on the age/productivity relationship. According to Johnson
(1993), most employers and employees believe that average labor productivity
declines after some age between ages 40 and 50. Skirbekk (2003) argues that job
performance declines after age 50. But Aubert and Crépon (2007) found that
productivity increases until age 40-45 and then remains stable after that age.
Finally, Göbel and Zwick (2009) nd that productivity grows until age 40-45,
and then stabilizes until age 60. Given those contradicting results, we will take
 = 1 as a benchmark case, and consider alternative values for  as a way to
show how Sauvys intuition can a¤ect optimal fertility in our model.
The following table summarizes the calibration of parameters taken as a
benchmark.
parameters     A   
values 1.00 0.45 1.25 0.48 20 0.49 1.00 1.00
5.4 Results
This subsection computes the socially optimal fertility rate in our economy, and
compares it with the actual fertility rate for Wallonia in 1960, equal to 2.6
children per women, which, in normalized terms, is equal to n = 1:3. For that
purpose, we will proceed as follows. For each possible fertility rate within a
biologically feasible interval n 2 [0; 6], we derive the associated optimal level
of k, and, then, the optimal levels of c, d and b, as well as the associated
average lifetime welfare. We then naturally nd the level of fertility which
leads to the maximum average lifetime well-being, and we compare it with the
actual fertility. We then repeat that procedure for di¤erent sets of structural
parameters, to assess the robustness of our results.
A rst important numerical result is the fact that, under the benchmark
calibration proposed in the previous subsection, the optimal fertility rate is a
corner solution at n = 0, whatever the postulated level of old skillsdecay ()
is. This rst result is shown on Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Average lifetime welfare as a function of fertility n and
decay  (benchmark values).
This result, which may appear surprising at rst glance, is not surprising
for economists studying optimal fertility in an OLG setting. Indeed, since the
study by Michel and Pestieau (1993), economists know that the existence of
an interior optimal fertility rate within a Diamond-type economy requires that
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is su¢ ciently low and that comple-
mentarity between capital and labor is su¢ ciently high. However, given the
postulated parametersvalues, there remains too much substitutability, leading
to a corner solution for fertility.
Let us now consider alternative calibrations, involving a lower value of the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution . As shown on Figure 3 (where axes
are reversed given the negative utility), assuming  = 0:5 allows us to obtain
an interior optimal fertility rate. Under  = 1 (no decay), the optimal fertility
is 0:5. The optimal n becomes slightly larger, equal to 0:6, when  decreases to
0:6. Note that the impact of  on the optimal fertility is non-monotonic, since
for  = 0:1 the optimal fertility goes back to 0:5. This result is in line with
the theoretical discussion we had above. Since the product FL
 
k; 1 + n

is
non-monotonic in , there is no reason to expect that the optimal fertility rate
is necessarily increasing with the extent of decay in old workers skills. Having
stressed this, it remains true, in any case, that the optimal fertility is far lower
than the one prevailing in Wallonia at that time (i.e. n = 1:3).
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Figure 3: Average lifetime welfare as a function of fertility (n)
and decay (), under  = 0:5:
Note that taking even lower values for  does not substantially a¤ect our
results. Under  = 0:2, the optimal fertility rate equals 0:8 when  = 1, rises
to 0:9 when  = 0:9, but then goes down to 0:7 when  = 0:1. Hence it
appears, here again, that taking into account the decay of old workers skills
does not su¢ ce, on its own, to lead to a large optimal fertility rate. This
result is robust, and prevails even when we reduce strongly the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution. One reason for this low level of optimal fertility lies
in the relatively high level of impatience (i.e.  = 0:45), which, by construction,
has the e¤ect to weaken the strength of the Samuelson e¤ect, and, hence, pushes
optimal fertility down.
In the light of this, it seems hard to reconcile Sauvys recommendation with
the predictions of the model. True, it is possible, in theory, to account for the
intuition that a higher decay of old workers skills may lead, in some cases, to
justify a higher fertility rate. However, our numerical exercise suggests that, for
reasonable values of the structural parameters, we obtain optimal fertility rates
that are far below the one prevailing in Wallonia in 1950s and 1960s. Thus our
numerical ndings to not seem to support Sauvys recommendation.
Finally, let us notice that, on the basis of the actual life expectancy prevailing
in Wallonia, i.e. 79 years, implying  equal to 19/20 = 0.95), the optimal fertility
still remains, under  = 0:8, quite low, and between 0.2 (when  = 1) and 0.5
(when  = 0:3). Thus better survival conditions push, ceteris paribus, towards a
higher optimal fertility, by reinforcing Samuelsons e¤ect. However, even under
a high decay of old workersskills, it is hard to regard fertility encouragement
as welfare-improving in the long-run in our rst-best setting.
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Figure 4: Average lifetime welfare as a function of fertility () and
decay (n), under  = 0:8 and  = 0:95 (contemporary survival
conditions).
6 Conclusions
In sum, this paper provides a contrasted view on Sauvys diagnosis on Walloon
fertility in the early 1960s. True, it is possible to incorporate Sauvys view on
ageing of workers and productivity within a simple OLG model à la Samuelson.
Once taking the decay of human skills into account, the optimal fertility rate
equalizes, at the margin, the sum of the capital dilution e¤ect (Solow e¤ect)
and the labor age-composition e¤ect (Sauvy e¤ect) with the intergenerational
redistribution e¤ect (Samuelson e¤ect). There is thus some simple way to ac-
count for issues of old workers productivity when discussing optimal fertility in
a Samuelsonian economy.
However, when turning to numbers, it appears that even large levels of decay
in old workersskills do not su¢ ce to support Sauvys views on Walloon fertility.
Our numerical simulations suggest that, even though a higher extent of decay
leads, in general (but not always), to a larger optimal fertility, the levels of
optimal fertility rates remain far below the observed ones, and also below the
ones recommended by Sauvy in his report.
One should not take these results as a criticism of Sauvys thought on pop-
ulation. Quite the contrary, our calculations suggest that the rationale used by
Sauvy to dene the optimal fertility could not take, as a unique social objective,
the maximization of average social welfare in Wallonia at that time. Obviously,
some other considerations, either for numbers, or for culture and knowledge, or
16
for what he called power, were playing a role in his recommendations. Hence,
before saying that he was right or wrong, we need rst to consider how those
other concerns could be properly included in an exhaustive economic analysis
of optimal fertility. This remains to be done.
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